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In this paper we  discuss a recent paper by  Stephen E. Haynes in  which he relates 
electoral cycles in political support to electoral cycles in economic variables. Haynes 
finds that the cycle in support for Republican presidents is explained by  the cycle in 
economic variables, whereas the cycle in support for Democratic presidents is not. In 
our opinion this shortcoming is due to his specification of  the popularity function. 
Haynes estimates a popularity  function  which  incorporates the notion that voters 
reward  the incumbent for favourable outcomes (score hypothesis). Our popularity 
function combines the score hypothesis and the notion that voters cast their ballots 
for the party that best fits the current economic situation (issue hypothesis). We show 
that the electoral cycle in popularity of both Republican and Democratic presidents is 
explained very well by the cycle in economic variables. 
I. ITRODUCTION 
How are political  cycles in  economic variables  related  to 
economic cycles in political support? This is the basic ques- 
tion considered by  Haynes (1995) in  a recent paper in this 
journal. To answer this question, Haynes takes the follow- 
ing four steps. First, he determines political cycles in eco- 
nomic variables by  calculating the means of GNP growth, 
the unemployment rate and inflation for each quarter of the 
electoral  term.  To detect  partisan  cycles he  repeats  this 
analysis,  making  a  distinction  between  Democratic and 
Republican administrations. The results from this exercise 
confirm earlier findings. As to unemployment and real out- 
put growth, the performance of Democratic administrations 
is  superior  to that of  Republican  administrations in  the 
second  and  third year  of  the electoral term. In  the  year 
before the election, real output growth is somewhat higher 
under Republican administrations than under Democratic 
administrations. In terms of  inflation, the performance of 
Republican administrations is  superior  at the end  of  the 
electoral term. Second, Haynes calculates the mean of politi- 
cal  support  for  the  incumbent  for  each  quarter  of  the 
electoral term. Again his results are consistent with conven- 
tional  wisdom.  Public  support for  both  Democratic and 
Republican  presidents declines  when  time evolves. How- 
ever, at the end  of  the electoral term, public  support for 
Democratic presidents further declines while that of Repub- 
lican presidents rises. Third, Haynes presents the estimates 
of  popularity functions which support the idea that voters 
hold the incumbent responsible for economic outcomes. 
As with many previous authors, Haynes finds that presi- 
dential approval rates increase with real output growth and 
decrease with unemployment and inflation (see Nannestad 
and Paldam, 1994, for a recent survey of this literature). So 
far, there is nothing new under the sun. The novel contribu- 
tion  of  Haynes'  paper  is  in  the  final  step,  in  which  he 
combines the first three steps. Making use of  the partisan 
means of  the economic variables  for  each  quarter of  the 
electoral  term  (step  I),  he  predicts  public  support  for 
Democratic and Republican presidents on the basis of  the 
estimates of  the popularity functions (step 3). For Republi- 
can  presidents,  the  predicted  cycle  in  public  support  is 
similar  to  the  cycle  determined  in  step  2.  However, 





































































9W.  Letterie and 0.  H. Swank 
Predicted and actual popularity for Democratic presidents 
differ markedly. It seems as if  voters hardly reward Demo- 
cratic presidents for the favourable economic outcomes in 
the middle of  the electoral term. 
In this comment, we  repeat the third and fourth step of 
Haynes' analysis, making use of a different specification of 
the popularity function. The popularity function employed 
combines the notion that voters reward the incumbent for 
favourable economic outcomes and the notion that voters 
cast their ballots for the party which best fits the economic 
problems the country faces. The reason why we use a differ- 
ent specification of the popularity function is twofold. First, 
the empirical success of the partisan theory suggests that the 
US political system is polarized. Recent empirical studies on 
voter behaviour indicate that voters take into account that 
political  parties  pursue  different  goals  (see  for  example 
Swank,  1995). Second,  the  popularity  function  used  by 
Haynes is successful in predicting the popularity of Republi- 
can presidents but fails when predicting the popularity of 
Democratic  presidents.  This  suggests  that  the  effects  of 
economic outcomes on public support are asymmetric. This 
is exactly what partisan voter models imply. Thus, we  be- 
lieve that extending the voter model with elements from the 
partisan  theory  is  a  promising  road  to improve Haynes' 
results. 
This comment is organized as follows. In the next section 
we  briefly discuss a simple partisan model which underlies 
our voter  model.  We  argue that the economic outcomes 
generated  by  the  partisan  model  are consistent  with  the 
cycles in economic variables that Haynes has determined in 
the first step of  his analysis. Section 111 presents the esti- 
mates of  the new  popularity functions. Finally, Section 1V 
confronts the predicted cycle in presidential popularity with 
the actual cycle in presidential  popularity. Unlike Haynes, 
we find that our predictions of popularity are closely related 
to actual popularity for both Democratic and Republican 
presidents. Before proceeding, it is worth emphasizing that 
this comment is intended to contribute to Haynes'  paper, 
rather than to criticize it. 
11. A PARTISAN MODEL 
In this section we discuss a partisan model based on Hibbs 
(1994). This model shows how economic outcomes depend 
on the type of president in office. The reason for discussing 
this model is twofold. First, at the end of this section we will 
argue that the outcomes generated by the model are consis- 
tent  with the empirical  results presented  by  Haynes. The 
second  reason  is  that  this  partisan  model  underlies  the 
estimated popularity functions presented in the next section. 
The model describes aggregate demand policy and con- 
sists of  two parts. The first part of the model describes the 
presidents'  preferences. Both  Democratic and Republican 
administrations are  assumed  to  care  about  real  output 
growth, Ay,, and inflation, n,. Their preferences are repre- 
sented by  a linear-quadratic utility function: 
where  pi  is  the  weight party  i  attributes to the inflation 
target relative to the real output target, and t is a time index. 
The basic premise on which the partisan theory is bascd is 
that due to distributional interests of their core constituen- 
cies, Republican presidents give higher weight to the infla- 
tion target than Democratic presidents, so that 8,  > p,.  As 
for Equation (I), the partisan model employed in this paper 
is  similar  to  the  models  employed  in  previous  studies 
(Alesina, 1987; Hibbs, 1977). 
The second part of the model describes the working of the 
economy. Policy makers are assumed to affect real output 
growth and inflation by a nominal demand policy. Equation 
(2) expresses  how  a  change  in  nominal  demand  affects 
inflation: 
where  Ax,  denotes  the  change  in  nominal  demand  and 
(yr/ylrCnd)  denotes the  deviation  of  log  real  output from 
its trend.  Since by  definition  Ay, = Ax, -  n,,  real  output 
growth can be written as: 
In modern  economic literature, Equations (2) and (3) are 
frequently used to assess the short run effects of a change in 
nominal demand on inflation and real output growth. The 
basic idea behind this short run Phillips curve is that, in the 
long-run, real output returns to its natural path (~i,~,,~).  As 
a consequence, in the long run, excess nominal demand fully 
shows up inflation. However, due to price rigidities the short 
run effects of  nominal demand on inflation may differ from 
the long run effects. In Equation (21, y,  measures how much 
of a change in nominal demand instantaneously shows up in 
inflation  (0 6 y, ,<  1). Likewise, in  Equation (3), (1 -  7,) 
measures how much of a change in nominal demand shows 
up in  real output. The effects  of  lagged inflation  and the 
lagged deviation of log real output from its trend (the output 
gap) on inflation describe how prices gradually adjust after 
a shock in nominal demand, to restore the long run equilib- 
rium  (0 6 y2 ,<  1,  51,  > 0). The higher  are  y2 and  ;I,.  the 
quicker is the price adjustment process. 
Each president is assumed to maximize Equation (1) with 
respect to Ax,, subject to Equations (2)  and (3). Substitution 
of  the resultant expression into Equations (2) and (3) yiclds 
the economic outcomes generated by  the model. Does the 
model generate the potential cycles in economic variables 
observed by  Haynes? 
Haynes'  observations that for real variables the overall 





































































9Electoral and partisan cycles 
while for inflation  the overall performance of  Republican 
administrations is  (mildly) superior are a straightforward 
consequence of  the assumption of  partisan motives. There 
remains  the  question  whether  we  can  explain  the  more 
subtle  movements  in  economic  outcomes  observed  by 
Haynes. For Republicans, Haynes observes that GNP  growth 
is much lower in the first two years of the electoral term than 
for Democrats, but at the end of  the electoral term  GNP 
growth is above average under Republican administrations 
and below average under Democratic administrations. The 
estimates of  the popularity functions presented in the next 
section indicate that a Republican candidate is most likely 
to win  the elections when  inflationary pressures  are high. 
Since Republicans give a high weight to the inflation target 
relative to the output target, inflationary pressures induce 
Republicans  to implement  a  contractionary  policy.  This 
immediately  leads  to a  fall  in  real  output growth.  Since 
inflation  reacts  to nominal  demand  policy  with  a  lag, it 
remains temporarily high. However, inflationary pressures 
gradually decline, because (y/y,,,,,),-,  falls. In the middle of 
the  electoral  term,  inflationary  pressures  are  low.  From 
Equation (3) it is easy to see that low inflationary pressures 
increase the scope for real output growth. Thus, when a Re- 
publican president  has succeeded in  reducing inflationary 
pressures, real  output growth has a tendency  to rise.  Be- 
cause, after the trough in real output growth, the level of real 
output is likely to be below its trend, this tendency to higher 
real output growth can be accommodated by  nominal de- 
mand policy without danger of  inflation. 
As  to GNP growth and inflation,  the story for Demo- 
cratic presidents is  almost the reverse. Democratic candi- 
dates are most likely to be elected when inflationary pres- 
sures are low and the level of  real output is below its trend. 
Democratic presidents respond to these economic circum- 
stances by an expansionary policy. Economic growth rises 
and, as time evolves, inflationary pressures  rise. Through 
Equation (3), this implies that there is less  scope for  real 
output growth. At  the end of  the electoral cycle, inflation 
rises,  which  implies that the  cost  of  expansionary  policy 
increases. As  a consequence,  at the end  of  a  Democratic 
administration's term, real output growth is likely to be low. 
In  the above explanation  of  the political  cycles in  eco- 
nomic variables,  the output gap plays  an important  role. 
Figure 1 is a plot of  the electoral patterns for (y,/y,,,,,).' 
Following Haynes, the electoral  patterns are specified as 
a regression on 32 dummy variables, one for each quarter of 
the Democratic and Republician presidential term. 
At the beginning of the electoral term, the output gap is 
lower for Democrats than for Republicans. This is in line 
with the prediction of our model that a Democratic (Repub- 
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Fig. 1.  y,/y,,,,,  (Democrats -;  Republicans --------) 
pressures  are low (high). For Democrats, the output gap 
rises until the sixth quarter of  the electoral term, while for 
Republicans the output gap falls till the eighth quarter. For 
Democrats, after the sixth quarter the output gap remains 
rather stable until the twelfth quarter after which it slightly 
falls. This fall is due to the response of  Democratic presi- 
dents to rising inflation. In the second part of  the Republi- 
can electoral term, the output gap rises, although it does not 
approximate the output gap for Democrats. The output gap 
can rise, because the decline in inflationary pressures reduc- 
es  the  need  for  contractionary  policy.  Overall,  Fig. 1 is 
consistent with the predictions of the partisan theory. The 
observation  that, at the  end  of  the  terms  of  Republican 
administrations, real output growth tends to be higher than 
the mean real output growth rate, is probably the result of 
the dynamics of the economic system, rather than the result 
of electoral objectives. 
111.  ECONOMIC VARIABLES AND 
PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY 
Following  Haynes  (1995), we  first  estimate  a  popularity 
function which identifies the relationship between economic 
variables and presidential  approval rates. Next, using this 
equation we  calculate the predicted response of  popularity 
to economic performance. These results are used to calcu- 
late electoral and partisan patterns in populatiry. 
The data 
We  use  quarterly  data  for  the  period  1952: 1-1990:4. 
Presidential  popularity  is  measured  by  the  percentage 





































































91588  W.  Letterie and 0.  H.  Swarlk 
respondents who answer 'approve' to the well-known Gal-  The competency model  - - 
lup survey question: 'Do  you  approve or disapprove  the 
way that [I  is handling his job as President' listed in 
Haynes (1995). The economic variables we consider are real 
GNP growth, inflation  and unemployment. We calculate 
these variables using real GNP  data (RGNP), the consumer 
price index (CPI) and unemployment data (UNEM) which 
are published in Haynes (1995). Real GNP  growth (Ay,) and 
inflation  (71,) are: 
CPI, 
IT, = loo(- CPI, - -  1) 
The variable (y/y,,,,,),-,  is  equal  to the  residual  of  the 
following equation, E,, which  we  estimate for  the  period 
1953:l- 1990:4 by  the method of  ordinary least  square^:^ 
tr is a standard trend term and tr75 is an additional trend 
variable which starts in  1975:l.' 
In many studies where the response of presidential popu- 
larity to economic variables is measured, it is argued that 
one should control for  the effects of  some non-economic 
variables (Hibbs, 1982; Chappell and Keech,  1985; Chap- 
pell,  1990).  Following  these  studies  we  consider  three 
additional types of  explanatory variables. First, we  include 
intercept dummies to account for individual characteristics 
of  the presidents. Secondly, episodic events may influence 
the approval rates of presidents. We control for the involve- 
ment of  the US in  the Vietnam  war and we  measure the 
impact of the Watergate and Iran-Contra scandals on presi- 
dential popularity. The Watergate-dummy equals one from 
1973:4 to 1974:2, and is zero otherwise. The dummy for the 
Iran-Contra scandal is defined as one from 1986:4  to 1987:4, 
and is zero otherwise. To proxy the growing dissatisfaction 
of  the US electorate with the involvement in the Vietnam 
war we  experiment with several dummy specifications to 
account for this effect. For example, we try a dummy which 
equals one in  1964:3 and which increases by one after every 
4 quarters until  1968:2, and is zero otherwise. Thirdly, we 
consider the relevance of  honeymoon effects. We estimate 
the honeymoon effect with six dummy variables Posti which 
equal one in the ith quarter after each election, and are zero 
otherwise. 
Our popularity function partly reflects a tradition according 
to which voters evaluate economic performance in order to 
assess the incumbent's competence (cf. Kramer, 1971; Fair, 
1978; Hibbs, 1982; Chappell and Keech, 1985). In line with 
this notion, voters vote to retain the incumbent when  the 
economy performs well, while if  the economy deteriorates 
the voters hold the incumbent responsible and then voters 
punish. Hence, we expect that voters reward the incumbent 
party when real GNP growth is high, but shift their votes to 
the opposition when inflation is high. 
The partisun voter model 
Our popularity function also incorporates the notion that 
voters may use their vote 'to pick the party that best fits the 
current economic situation'  (Balke, 1991). A  rationale  for 
this  idea  is  that  parties  pursue  partisan  policies (Hibbs, 
1977; Alesina and Sachs, 1988). These studies suggest that 
for the United  States the Republican party finds fighting 
inflation  more important, whereas  the  Democratic party 
attaches higher priority to stimulating real output growth. If 
voters are aware of this difference, they may select a govern- 
ment  considering the parties'  reputation of  being able to 
solve a specific set of economic problems (see also Swank, 
1993). Hence,  we  expect  that higher  inflation  makes  the 
Republican party more attractive to the electorate than the 
Democratic party, because the Republican party has a repu- 
tation of being tough on inflation. 
High positive values of the output gap reduce the appeal to 
the Democratic party. The reason for this is that stimulating 
economic growth during a period when real GNP  exceeds its 
trend value triggers inflationary pressures, because then the 
economy operates near full-capacity. As we just  argued, in 
that case Republicans gain popularity, implying a reduction 
of Democratic support, because of their relatively high infla- 
tion aversion. If, however, the output gap is low then the 
opposite argument holds, since then inflationary pressures 
are less  prevailing,  so that  the  marginal  costs  of  stimu- 
lating economic growth are small in terms of higher inflation. 
Swank  (1996) argues that one may  doubt whether the 
output gap is a variable that is easily ascertainable to voters. 
Since voters  have little incentives to gather  sophisticated 
information about the economy, they are likely to vote on 
the basis of economic variables that are easy to understand. 
Therefore, following Swank (1996),  we also estimate a popu- 
larity function in  which  the  output gap is  replaced  with 
unemployment. The reason for this is twofold. First, for the 
Standard errors are given  in parentheses. 





































































9Electoral and partisan  cycles 
United States, unemployment is a reasonable substitute for 
the output gap, because they are both related to the business 
cycle. Secondly, in many studies it is found that unemploy- 
ment is an important determinant of  voter decisions. We 
expect that high unemployment increases the popularity of 
the Democratic party, because this party is prone to solve 
this  problem,  and  we  expect  that  low  unemployment 
favours Republican popularity. 
It is  worthwhile  noting that  the  partisan  voter  model 
implies  that economic  variables  affect  presidential  popu- 
larity asymmetrically: we  expect that higher (lower) unem- 
ployment, lower (higher) (y/y,,,,,)  and lower (higher) infla- 
tion increase the popularity of the Democratic (Republican) 
party.  In  order to account  for  the  asymmetric effects  of 
these  economic  variables  we  define  a  dummy  variable, 
dern,,  which  equals one during democratic incumbencies, 
and  is  zero  otherwise.  We  introduce  the  following 
variables  to  measure  the  implications  of  the  partisan 
voter  model  for  presidential  popularity:  dem,(y,/y,,,,,) 
-  (1 -  dem,) (y,/y ,,,,  ,),  dem,unem, -  (1 -  dem,)unem,, and 
dem,~,  - (1 -  dem,)n,.  As  discussed  above, the expected 
signs of these variables are negative, positive and negative, 
respectively. 
Estimation results 
The popularity  function  is  estimated  using  an  ordinary 
least  squares  technique  which  corrects  for  first  order 
autocorrelation.  The estimation  results  are  presented  in 
Table  1. All  parameter  estimates are found  to be  signifi- 
cant  at conventional  levels. The results  show  that  both 
the  terms,  representing  the  competency  model  and  the 
PVM, contribute to the explanation of  presidential popu- 
larity. The estimates corresponding  to the variables  that 
are labelled [competency model]  indicate that presidential 
popularity decreases if  real growth decreases or if  inflation 
rises. Hence, voters are found to hold the incumbent respon- 
sible for unfavourable economic conditions. We also find 
support for the implications of the PVM. In Equations (a) 
and  (b) these  estimates  show  that  Republican  support 
increases  when  inflation  rises  irrespective  of  the  incum- 
bent's  political colour. Equation (b) shows that high  un- 
employment raises the popularity of  the Democratic party 
and  Equation  (a)  shows  that  if  the  economy  operates 
near full capacity (high (yly,,,,,)),  which triggers inflation- 
ary  pressures,  then  the  Republican  party  gains  public 
support. 
We  have estimated  several  extensions of  Equations (a) 
and (b), none of them being successful. For example, we have 
estimated popularity functions including dummies to con- 
trol for special circumstances like the Vietnam war and the 
Iran-Contra scandal. Neither of these variables contributes 
significantly to the explanation of  presidential popularity. 
We  have also estimated  popularity  functions taking into 
account  the  honeymoon-effect  discussed  earlier.  Again, 
1589 











BY,  [Competency model] 
Xt  [Competency model] 
dem, unem, -  (1 -  dern,)unern,  [PVM] 
dern, n, -  (1 -  dern,)  n,  [PVM] 
R 
Adjusted R2 
Standard error of  regression 
Ljung-Box  (10) 
Ljung-Box  (20) 
Box-Pierce  (10) 
Box-Pierce  (20) 
Notes:  The dependent  variable is  the  percentage approval rate 
from  Gallup. Estimates for  the effects of  personal attributes of 
presidents  and  the  Watergate-scandal are  presented. The  label 
[competency model] ([PVM]) refers to variables consistent with 
the competency (partisan voter) model. Standard errors are given 
in  parentheses. All  parameters are significant at  the  0.05 level 
or  better  and  are  properly  signed.  The  Ljung-Box(k)  and 
Box-Pierce(k) statistics are calculated  using  k autocorrelations 
and do not reject the hypothesis of  no serial correlation of the error 
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none  of  the  dummies  Post1  to  Post6  is  associated  with 
significant parameter estimates. 
Our estimates are robust to all of the extensions to Equa- 
tions  (a) and  (b) just  mentioned.  Furthermore, our con- 
clusions regarding Equation (a)  remain if  we use alternatives 
to the variable (yly,,,,,).  Obvious alternatives are obtained 
by replacing tr75 with trjj (jj  = 69 to 81) and re-estimating 
Equation (4) to calculate (y/y,,,,d).4 We have also estimated 
Equation  (4) without  an  additional trend  term  trjj and 
obtained (yly,,,,,).  Finally,  we  have  replaced  (yly,,,,,)  in 
Equation (a) with one of  its alternatives. The nature of the 
results is not affected. 
In our popularity function, the variables Ay,  and n, are 
annual percentage changes using quarterly data. One prob- 
lem with these variables is that the performance of  a new 
president depends on data from the previous administration 
(see for example, Chappell and Keech, 1985 and Chappell, 
1990). We have recalculated  Ay,  and n, using within term 
data for  those quarters that are subject  to this  problem. 
Although estimates of the popularity function based on the 
adjusted variables  show that the  response  of  presidential 
popularity to Ay, is lower than in Table 1, the results are not 
changed q~alitatively.~ 
IV. PREDICTED POPULARITY 
In this section we show that our estimated popularity func- 
tion performs very well regarding the explanation of  both 
Republican  and  Democratic  popularity.  To this end, we 
compute electoral  means  of  actual and  fitted  popularity 
using Equation (a) from Table  Following Haynes (1995), 
the cycle of  electoral  means  of  a  variable  is obtained by 
regressing this variable on 16 dummies, one for each quarter 
of  the four-year presidential term. The regression equation 
does not specify an intercept term, which implies that the 
coefficients of  the dummies denote the mean for each quar- 
ter of the electoral period. We calculate the electoral cycle of 
actual and fitted popularity for Republicans and Democrats 
separately. 
In Fig. 2 the electoral means for actual Republican popu- 
larity are given by the solid line. The dashed line depicts the 
electoral means of fitted Republican p~pularity.~  It appears 
from  Fig. 2 that the  electoral  means of  fitted  popularity 
track the corresponding values for actual popularity  very 
closely. Thus, Fig. 2 indicates that our popularity function 
Fig. 2.  Republican  popularity  by  electoral  quarter  (fitted values 
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  - ,  actual values -) 
explains Republican popularity very well. In fact, the cor- 
relation  coefficient between  actual and fitted  Republican 
popularity is equal to 0.903. 
Figure 3 depicts the electoral cycles of  actual (solid line) 
and fitted (dashed line) Democratic popularity.'  We observe 
that the electoral means of fitted popularity are close to the 
electoral means  of  actual  Democratic popularity.  Hence, 
Fig. 3 suggests that our popularity function is a good de- 
scription of Democratic popularity. This conclusion is sup- 
ported  by  the correlation  coefficient of  actual and  fitted 
Democratic popularity, which equals 0.941. 
Haynes (1995) is interested in the question of  how move- 
ments  in  economic conditions  contribute  to presidential 
popularity. He computes predicted electoral means of popu- 
larity by  multiplying the electoral means of  economic vari- 
ables by  the  appropriate parameters  from  the  popularity 
function. Predicted popularity  is therefore independent of 
non-economic variables. Haynes reports that the estimated 
popularity function implies that the correlation between the 
electoral means of actual and predicted Republican popular- 
ity is significant at 0.632, whereas the correlation coefficient 
of  the electoral means of  actual and predicted Deinocratic 
popularity  is  insignificant.  Hence,  according  to Hayncs' 
results economic conditions do not explain  very well  the 
actual electoral cycle of Democratic support. Following the 
same procedure as Haynes we  obtain Figs 4 and 5, which 
4The trend term  trjj starts in 19jj: 1. 
It is not a problem to base the three variables, which measure the implications of  the partisan voter model, on data outside the electoral 
term. In the partisan voter model, voters are not primarily interested in who is  responsible for the economic situation. 
Using Equation (b) yields similar results. 
'The  pooled  mean  of  presidential popularity (i.e. 56.56) is  subtracted from  the electoral means  of  both  actual and  fitted values of 
popularity. 






































































9Electoral und partisan  cycles 
Fig. 3.  Democratic  popularity  by  electoral  quarter  (jtted values 
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  - ,  actual values ---) 
present the results for the Republican and Democratic case, 
respectively. The solid  line  depicts  the electoral  cycle  of 
actual popularity. The dashed line gives the electoral cycle 
of  popularity due to  movements  in economic   variable^.^ 
The correlation coefficient between  the electoral means of 
actual  and  predicted  popularity  of  both  Republican and 
Democratic presidents are very high: 0.69 and 0.88, respec- 
tively."  Hence, we find that the electoral cycle of presiden- 
tial  popularity  is  highly  determined  by  the  response  of 
popularity to changes in economic performance. 
It appears from Fig. 4 that the popularity of  Republican 
presidents  declines  due to economic  forces  until  the  8th 
quarter of  the electoral term. After the 8th quarter popu- 
larity recovers, but remains below its initial value. Figure 5 
shows that due to economic changes Democratic popularity 
decreases until the 8th quarter, then stabilizes until the 12th 
quarter and decreases again until the end of  the electoral 
term. Hence, irrespective of their political colour, all presi- 
dents face declining popularity due to economic movements 
during the  first  2  years  of  their  incumbency.  However, 
Republican  presidents  witness  a  reversal  of  this  process 
in  the last  two years  of  their  terms  whereas  Democrats 
do not. 
Our model  sheds  some light  on  the phenomenon  de- 
scribed above. We have found that voters base their vote on 
the competency of the candidates and on the reputation of 
Fig. 4. Republican popularity  by electoral quarter (predicted values 
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  - ,  actual values -) 
Fig. 5.  Detnocraric popularity  by electoral quarter (predicted values 
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  - ,  actual values -) 
the candidates'  political  parties  to solve  a  specific set  of 
economic problems (PVM). In light  of  the PVM it is not 
surprising that incumbent presidents are initially very popu- 
lar. The elected president is chosen because voters perceive 
that his preferences are likely to fit  the most  urgent  eco- 
nomic problems. Consequently, the political preferences of 
the  president  assure  voters  that  the  president  will  start 
We  choose the intercept dummy for Republican (Democratic)  presidents equal to 50 (72.5). This choice is not important for our analysis, 
since the pattern of  both the Republican and the Democratic electoral cycle is  invariant to transformations by  adding or subtracting 
constant terms. Equivalently, the correlation coefficients reported in the text are not affected by different constant terms, since it holds that 
corr(x,; y,) = corr(x, + a; y,) 
lo  Calculating predicted popularity using the presidential intercepts presented in Table 1, we  find corresponding correlation coefficients of 






































































9W.  Letterie and 0.  H. Swank 
dealing with  the economic problems  once he is in office. 
Republicans fight inflation by inducing a recession. Demo- 
crats deal with unemployment and stimulate growth at the 
cost of higher inflation. Gradually, once the partisan policy 
becomes  effective  the  demand  for  solving  the  problems 
decreases and, according to the PVM, the incumbent presi- 
dent becomes less popular. 
Previous studies on presidential popularity account for 
the high popularity of presidents at the beginning of  their 
terms by the inclusion of honeymoon dummy variables. In 
contrast to those studies we find honeymoon variables to be 
insignificant at conventional levels. The honeymoon effect is 
often introduced to capture the notion that voters give the 
president the benefit of  the doubt, because the just  elected 
president inherits the state of  the economy from his prede- 
cessor and therefore has no performance record that can be 
taken seriously. The PVM provides an alternative rationale 
for  the honeymoon effect. It suggests  that presidents are 
very popular initially, because they are thought to be the 
suitable type to solve the problems. The president becomes 
less popular, because dealing with the economic problems 
makes him more or less redundant. 
The next question is why presidents of different political 
colour face different electoral patterns in popularity during 
the  second  part  of  their  incumbency.  As  noted  before, 
Republican presidents pursue restrictive policies and Demo- 
cratic presidents follow expansionary policies. The distinct 
policy stances have different consequences for the last two 
years of a president's  term. In line with the working of the 
economy we described in Section I1 (see Equations (2) and 
(3)),  the last  two  years of  a  Republican  incumbency  are 
characterized by an environment in which inflation remains 
stable and economic growth recovers since, if  real GNP  is 
low, it tends to grow to its trend value. However, a Demo- 
cratic president faces an economic situation in which infla- 
tionary  pressures  show  up and  where  economic  growth 
declines because  if real GNP  is high it tends to decline to 
return to its trend value again. These different economic 
patterns may contribute to an explanation of the dissimilar 
popularity movements of Republican and Democratic presi- 
dents during the last years of  their terms. The popularity 
function we reported in the previous section shows that, in 
line with  the competency model, the electorate  holds  the 
incumbent responsible  for  unfavourable  economic condi- 
tions.  Presidents are rewarded  for  economic  growth  but 
punished  for  inflation.  We  observed  that  the  last  two 
years  of  a  Republican  term  are characterized  by  favour- 
able economic conditions, whereas the opposite holds for 
Democratic  incumbents.  Hence,  the  distinct  patterns  of 
popularity during the last two years of a presidential term 
can  be  explained  by  the implications  of  the competency 
model. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
We gratefully acknowledge Stephen Haynes and an anony- 
mous referee of this journal for their comments. The usual 
disclaimer applies. 
REFERENCES 
Alesina, A. (1987) Macroeconomic policy in a two-party system as 
a repeated game, Quarterlp Journal of  Economics, 52,651  -78. 
Alesina, A. and Sachs, J. D. (1988) Political parties and the business 
cycle  in  the  United  States, 1948-1984,  Journal  of  Money, 
Credit and Banking, 20, 63-82. 
Balke, N. S. (1991) Partisanship theory, macroeconomic outcomes, 
and  endogenous elections, Southern  Economic  Journal, 57, 
920-35. 
Chappell, H.  W. (1990) Economic performance, voting and politi- 
cal support: a unified approach, The Review of  Economics and 
Statistics, 72, 313-20. 
Chappell, H. W. and Keech, W. R. (1985) A new  view  of  political 
accountability for economic performance, American Political 
Science Review, 79, 10-27. 
Fair, R.  C. (1978) The effect  of  economic events on  votes for 
president, The Review of  Economics and Statistics, 60,159-73. 
Haynes, S.  E. (1995) Electoral and  partisan cycles between  US 
economic performance  and  presidential popularity, Applied 
Economics, 27, 95-105. 
Hibbs, D. A.  (1977) Political parties and macroeconomic policy, 
American Political Science Review, 71, 1467-87. 
Hibbs,  D.  A.  (1982) On  the  demand  for  economic outcomes: 
macroeconomic performance and  mass  political support in 
the  United  States, Great  Britain, and Germany, Journal  of 
Politics, 44,  426-62. 
Hibbs, D. A. (1994) The partisan model of  macroeconomic cycles: 
more theory and evidence for the United States, Economics 
and  Politics, 6, 1-26. 
Kramer, G. H. (1971) Short-term fluctuations in US voting bchav- 
ior, 1896-1964,  American Political Science Review, 65, 13 1 - 43. 
Nannestad, P. and  Paldam, M. (1994) How  robust is  the  vote 
function? A  survey of  the literature on vote and popularity 
functions after 25 years, Public Choice, 79, 21 3 45. 
Swank, 0.  H. (1993) Popularity functions based on the partisan 
theory, Public Choice, 75, 339-56. 
Swank, 0.  H. (1995) Rational voters  in  a partisanship model, 
Social Choice and  Welfare, 12, 13-27. 
Swank, 0. H.  (1996) Partisan  policies,  macroeconomic perfor- 
mance, and political support. Mimeo. 
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
B
y
:
 
[
S
w
e
t
s
 
C
o
n
t
e
n
t
 
D
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
]
 
A
t
:
 
0
9
:
3
2
 
6
 
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
 
2
0
0
9